Open the managed-SSE replication gate (backlog#1783, PR-B of 3, after
#5872): the replication reader already decrypts through the injected
object-encryption resolver, so the source sends plaintext plus an
encryption intent header (AES256 / aws:kms, never the source key id) and
the target re-encrypts on its normal PUT path with its own KMS. No DEK
crosses sites.
- replication_put_object_options: fail closed only on Unsupported;
insert the SSE intent after the strip loop.
- TargetClient::create_multipart_upload sends the full opts.header()
set, fixing multipart replicas losing content-type/user metadata
(plaintext included).
- Preserve source ETag and mtime on replicas (authorized replication
only): receiver wires x-rustfs-source-etag into preserve_etag for PUT
and CompleteMultipartUpload, resolve_complete_etag consumes it, and
complete options carry source_etag/source_mtime (absent mtime
degrades to epoch, not now_utc). Without this every replication HEAD
comparison re-drives re-encrypted objects forever.
- e2e: managed SSE contracts flip to success on an independent-KMS
dual-process pair (byte-identical plain GET proves target-owned
envelopes; ETag/mtime preserved; version stable across scanner
cycles; resync converges; multipart keeps structure and metadata);
new target-without-KMS fail-closed contract; SSE-C stays FAILED.
Co-authored-by: houseme <[email protected]>
