test(e2e): negative presigned-URL SigV4 suite (backlog#1151 sec-2)
Add crates/e2e_test/src/presigned_negative_test.rs, the query-string
SigV4 sibling of the header-SigV4 suite (sec-1, #4708). Presigned URLs
were only exercised on the happy path, so nothing pinned our end-to-end
enforcement of expiry or query-signature verification.
Against a live single-node RustFSTestEnvironment (random port, isolated
temp dir), the suite asserts HTTP status + S3 error <Code> for:
- expired presigned GET -> 403 AccessDenied (Request has expired)
- tampered X-Amz-Signature -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch
- wrong secret key -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch
- tampered target key (swapped after signing) -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch
- tampered presigned PUT -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch + object not stored
- positive controls: valid presigned GET (body match) and PUT (HEAD verify)
Expiry is controlled without real waiting via the AWS SDK presigner's
start_time (sign as of one hour ago with a 60s window). s3s checks
expiry before the signature, so the expired case surfaces AccessDenied.
Wired into the e2e-smoke nextest profile (fast, single-node, no external
deps) so it runs on every PR per the crates/e2e_test/README.md admission
criteria.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1151 (sec-2), rustfs/backlog#1155.
test(admin-auth): unit + e2e coverage for the admin authorization gate
Adds the first tests for the central admin authorization gate
`rustfs/src/admin/auth.rs`, which previously had zero coverage
(backlog#1151 sec-4, master plan #1155).
Unit tests (rustfs/src/admin/auth.rs):
- Refactor the two `validate_admin_request*` entry points to share a
single generic decision core `evaluate_admin_actions<S: Store>` /
`check_admin_request_auth<S: Store>` (removes the duplicated
action-loop and makes the gate testable without a running cluster).
- Cover: owner/root credential allowed; authenticated non-admin
credential denied with AccessDenied; missing credential denied; and
the multi-action loop grants on any permitted action, denies when
none pass. Backed by an in-memory empty IamSys so the owner path
short-circuits to allow and every other principal resolves to deny.
E2E (crates/e2e_test/src/admin_auth_test.rs, raw SigV4 over HTTP, no
awscurl dependency):
- non_admin_credential_denied_on_admin_api: a limited IAM user gets
403 AccessDenied on GET /rustfs/admin/v3/info while root succeeds.
- root_credential_rotation_takes_effect: restart with rotated
--access-key/--secret-key; new credential works and the stale one is
rejected, on both the admin plane and the S3 data plane.
- default_credentials_emit_startup_warning: booting with the default
rustfsadmin credentials emits the default-credentials warning.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1151 (sec-4), #1155.
test(e2e): add negative header-SigV4 rejection suite (backlog#1151 sec-1)
RustFS delegates SigV4 verification to the s3s dependency, so nothing in
this repo pins OUR end-to-end wiring of it. Add negative_sigv4_test.rs
sending REJECTED header-SigV4 requests against a live RustFSTestEnvironment
and asserting the HTTP status plus the S3 error code XML:
- valid_header_sigv4_request_succeeds (positive control so the negatives
cannot pass for the wrong reason)
- tampered_signature_returns_signature_does_not_match -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch
- wrong_secret_key_returns_signature_does_not_match -> 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch
- tampered_payload_is_rejected (body != signed x-amz-content-sha256) -> not 200
- skewed_date_returns_request_time_too_skewed (>15min) -> 403 RequestTimeTooSkewed
- malformed_authorization_header_returns_clean_4xx (present-not-missing) -> 4xx, never 5xx
Signatures are hand-built via rustfs_signer::request_signature_v4 primitives
(get_signing_key/get_signature/get_scope) so the test controls the timestamp,
secret, signed payload hash, and final signature bytes. Missing-credential
negatives are intentionally not duplicated (covered by multipart_auth_test /
anonymous_access_test).
Refs backlog#1151 (sec-1), master plan backlog#1155.
Adds an S3-API-level e2e regression net proving that a large-object GET on a
degraded EC set never returns a silently truncated body under a full
Content-Length -- the historical "unexpected EOF" bug fixed on main by
rustfs#4594 (short-body GetObject stream -> UnexpectedEof), rustfs#4560
(in-place per-part legacy degradation for the lazy multipart reader), and
rustfs#4585 (DARE package-boundary truncation detection). Those fixes each
ship a *unit* regression; this covers the layer they do not -- the full HTTP
GET path streaming a real body reconstructed from real on-disk EC shards.
New file crates/e2e_test/src/degraded_read_eof_regression_test.rs, single-node
4-disk (EC 2+2) DiskFaultHarness, three scenarios:
(a) one disk offline: a 6 MiB single object (>=2 EC stripes) and a 3x5 MiB
multipart object GET back byte-identical with the correct Content-Length.
(b) mid-stream bitrot within quorum: 2 of 4 shards corrupted mid-file on a
large multipart object still reconstructs the full, hash-matching body.
(c) beyond read quorum (the heart of the net): 3 of 4 shards corrupted
mid-file -- the read MUST fail cleanly (non-2xx or a mid-stream body
error), NEVER close with a truncated body under the full Content-Length.
The shared get_checked() helper panics on the forbidden outcome (a clean 2xx
whose collected body is shorter than the advertised Content-Length), so the
truncation bug can never be silently tolerated.
CI placement: these spawn a 4-disk server per test and are resource-heavy, so
they stay OUT of the fast PR e2e-smoke filter. A new e2e-reliability nextest
test-group (max-threads=1) serializes them (and the existing
reliability_disk_fault_test) across nextest's process boundary; ci-7's nightly
full-e2e run picks them up. Visible via `cargo nextest list -p e2e_test`.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1150 (dist-13), rustfs/backlog#1155, rustfs#4594,
rustfs#4560, rustfs#4585, rustfs#2955.
Add crates/e2e_test/src/chaos.rs with in-process fault-injection
primitives for a single-node multi-disk RustFS server: take a disk
offline (rename to <dir>.offline), bring it back online, replace a
disk with a fresh empty directory, corrupt an object's erasure shard
(part.* byte flips, xl.meta untouched), and SIGKILL/restart the server
with the same volumes and port.
Add reliability tests on a 4-disk (EC 2+2) topology, verified via
sha256 manifests recorded at write time:
- degraded read/write with one disk offline (incl. multipart object)
- bitrot read-through with two corrupted shards per object
- fresh-disk replacement healed via admin deep heal after a SIGKILL
restart
Also reuse the shared signed_admin_post helper from chaos.rs in the
heal regression suite instead of a duplicated local copy.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
